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Abstract
Introduction: Despite the importance of political institutions in shaping the social environment, the causal impact
of politics on health care access and inequalities has been understudied. Even when considered, research tends to
focus on the effects of formal macro-political institutions such as the welfare state. We investigate how micro-politics
and informal institutions affect access to care.
Methods: This study uses a mixed-methods approach, combining findings from a household survey (n=1789) and
qualitative interviews (n=310) in Lebanon. Multivariate logistic regression was employed in the analysis of the survey
to examine the effect of political activism on access to health care while controlling for age, sex, socioeconomic status,
religious commitment and piety.
Results: We note a significantly positive association between political activism and the probability of receiving health
aid (p<.001), with an OR of 4.0 when comparing individuals with the highest political activity to those least active in
our sample. Interviews with key informants also reveal that, although a form of “universal coverage” exists in Lebanon
whereby any citizen is eligible for coverage of hospitalization fees and treatments, in practice, access to health services
is used by political parties and politicians as a deliberate strategy to gain and reward political support from individuals
and their families.
Conclusions: Individuals with higher political activism have better access to health services than others. Informal,
micro-level political institutions can have an important impact on health care access and utilization, with potentially
detrimental effects on the least politically connected. A truly universal health care system that provides access based on
medical need rather than political affiliation is needed to help to alleviate growing health disparities in the Lebanese
population.
Keywords: Informal political institutions, Health inequity, Mixed methods research, Lebanon
Introduction
Despite the importance of political institutions in shaping
the social environment, the causal impact of politics on
health and its inequities has been understudied [1,2]. Even
when considered, the political system is generally not
credited with a direct impact on health care access or is
seen to have an indirect influence on utilization via its
effect on economic conditions [3]. Furthermore, studies
tend to focus on formal political institutions at the
national level.
This article argues that political institutions can have
an important impact at the individual level through
informal practices. Focusing on Lebanon, we use a
mixed-methods approach to show that political organiza-
tions use access to health care as a strategy to gain and
reward support, leading to potentially detrimental effects
on the most vulnerable and exacerbating health
disparities.
Political institutions and health inequities
Although health is an important aspect of social policy
and is highly valued by people around the world, there
is only a limited literature on the relationship between
politics and population health [1]. Most studies come
from the social science literature on “welfare states,”
which tends to focus on advanced, industrialized
countries [4,5]. In general, studies in this vein contend
that political institutions affect population health and
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and determining the resources devoted to social
services [6-9]. Nevertheless, the literature is far from
reaching a definitive conclusion [10,11].
We argue that these macro-political mechanisms are
not the only ways in which politics shape access to
health and health outcomes. In this paper, we highlight
the role of informal politics in influencing access to
health care at the individual level. As we illustrate with
the example of Lebanon, informal practices, whereby
access to social services, including health, is used as a
deliberate strategy by politicians and political parties to
gain and reward support, can affect access to health
care and exacerbate health inequalities in the popula-
tion. Our study contributes to emerging research on the
dynamics of welfare regimes in the Global South, where
public welfare functions are less developed and private
actors may play a larger role than in industrialized
countries [12-16]. In this context, informal politics can
assume a critical role in shaping access to health and
health outcomes [17,18].
Lebanon provides an appropriate case study for
exploring the relationship between informal politics and
access to health care. Based on a power-sharing system,
political posts at all levels of government are distributed
according to sectarian affiliation while relations
between citizens and their elected representatives are
characterized by informal, clientelist exchanges. The
state has low administrative capacity and patronage and
corruption are endemic in the system [19,20]. In the
context of weak state institutions, the public sector
plays a minimal role in assuring social protection while
non-state actors predominate in the welfare regime. A
range of non-state providers, including political par-
ties, religious charities, community-based groups, non-
governmental organizations, and for-profit institutions,
supply and finance health care. Thus, the health sector
is an appropriate arena for examining the informal
political dynamics of gaining access to social assistance
[21]. The next section provides a brief overview of the
Lebanese health system as background for the empirical
analysis.
The Lebanese health system
The Lebanese health system is characterized by minimal
state regulation and heavy reliance on private, non-state
providers. The limited public welfare role in part
derives from the historical experience of social
organization along sectarian lines [22]. Civil war from
1975 to 1990 consolidated the provision of welfare by
sectarian groups as protracted conflict undercut the
limited public health infrastructure constructed in prior
decades and permitted the unrestricted growth of pri-
vate health services. Between 1975 and 1991, the share
of public hospital beds dropped from 26 percent to 10
percent of the total [23], and more than 50 percent of
private hospital bed capacity was concentrated in high-
cost curative care. After the war ended, the public
sector continued to play a minimal role in the direct
provision of health services.
Several political parties and movements operate inde-
pendent health networks, with their own hospitals, clinics
and dispensaries as well as computerized systems for
maintaining medical records. For example, various agen-
cies linked to the Shi’i Muslim Hezbollah operate four
hospitals and at least 24 clinics while the Shi’iA m a lM o v e -
ment administers about 13 clinics and exerts de facto
control over at least two public hospitals. The Sunni
Muslim Future Movement effectively manages one public
hospital and runs over 40 clinics through the affiliated
Hariri Foundation Health Directorate [24]. Yet the weight
of political organizations in health care far exceeds services
provided in their own facilities: Because political parties
use their connections to obtain subsidies provided by the
government or these institutions themselves for supporters
in private and non-governmental institutions run by co-
religionist charities or sympathetic physicians, their influ-
ence is broader than the number of health facilities that
they administer directly. NGO-run health clinics and
dispensaries, including those run by political parties, are
critical for lower-income families in urban areas and may
be the only facilities available in rural areas [25,26]. Fur-
thermore, high level appointments in the Ministry of Pub-
lic Health also follow a political logic. For example, the
Director General is usually Druze while the Minister may
rotate between sects. It is generally accepted in Lebanon
that differential access to these officials influences access
to coverage for inpatient care.
In contrast to its minimal role in service provision, the
government is a major source of health care financing,
particularly for secondary and tertiary care. In 2006, the
public sector accounted for almost 47 percent of total
health expenditures while out-of-pocket expenditures
amounted to about 39 percent of health spending.
Employers and donors supplied about 10 percent and 2
percent, respectively, of spending on health.
The vast majority of government spending on health
goes to the public hospitalization program, which
covered 100 percent of hospitalization fees until 1992
and 85 percent afterwards [27], as well as 60 percent
of high-tech ambulatory services such as MRIs and CT
scanners and 100 percent of cancer drugs [25]. On
paper, any citizen is eligible for these benefits. In prac-
tice, the program offers opportunities for personal dis-
cretion by ministry employees and enables political
parties and religious authorities to obtain favors for
supporters and congregationists while claiming credit
for these benefits. Moreover, because the government
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do not accept patients without demonstrated financial
means or without vouchers from powerful political
intermediaries. These facts all suggest that political
factors shape financial access to health care in Leba-
non, particularly for lower-income and needy indivi-
duals. The next section presents findings from a
household survey that indicates that political activism
does play an important role and therefore support our
hypothesis.
Data and methods
Between 2006 and 2009, Cammett carried out field
research in Lebanon on the provision of social welfare by
political and religious organizations, including in-depth
interviews with officials in the Ministries of Public
Health and Social Affairs, NGO representatives, officials
from political parties and religious institutions, and local
journalists and researchers (n=175). At the same time,
she worked with a team of Lebanese graduate students
to carry out in-depth interviews with Lebanese citizens
from diverse religious affiliations to gather information
on their experiences in accessing health care and other
forms of social assistance (n=135). The interviewees
were selected through purposive, non-random proce-
dures designed to maximize variation according to reli-
gious identity, place of residence, and socioeconomic
status.
These interviews provided critical background informa-
tion for the construction, execution and interpretation of a
national household survey, which was conducted in spring
2008 to collect information on access to primary and sec-
ondary healthcare, financial aid for health and other forms
of social assistance, religious identity and observance, pol-
itical preferences and participation, and standard demo-
graphic questions. The sample was designed as a cross-
section of all citizens above the age of 18 in Lebanon.
Based on a stratified, multi-stage, area probability sample,
households were selected randomly based on probability
proportionate to population size (PPPS). The sample was
stratified by province, reducing the likelihood that distinct-
ive regions, which tend to have varied concentrations of
religious or ethnic groups, were left out of the sample.
Next, a PPPS procedure was used to randomly select pri-
mary sampling units (PSU) in order to guarantee that
more populated geographical units had a greater probabil-
ity of being chosen. Households were then randomly
selected within each PSU. The response rate for the
national survey was 67 percent (1911 out of 2859 indivi-
duals). After excluding observations with missing data, our
final sample size for analysis is 1789.
The survey sample captured a broad cross-section of
the Lebanese population in terms of gender, age, socioe-
conomic status and sect (See Table 1). With this dataset,
we investigate the relationship between political activism
and the likelihood of individuals receiving financial aid
for health services.
The dependent variable, whether the individual
received financial aid for health services, is a dummy
variable where 1 indicates receipt of such aid and 0
otherwise. About one-third of the sample (34%) reported
receiving some form of financial assistance for health
care. The probability of receiving aid is slightly higher
among females and surprisingly, given the purpose of the
aid, highest among individuals in the highest income
quintile (Table 1).
Individual political activism is measured by the
Political Activity Index (PAI), which was constructed
through a factor analysis of responses to eight different
questions about forms of political participation, including
volunteering for a political organization, attending political
meetings, working for a party during elections, voting
behavior, party membership, support for a party, and dis-
playing political materials at home. The Cronbach’sa l p h a
coefficient, an estimate for internal consistency, for PAI is
071. In our sample population, PAI ranges from 0 to 374,
with a mean of 081 and standard deviation of 091.
The analyses also include variables to control for age,
sex, religious commitment and piety, and a range of
socioeconomic indicators, including reported household
income (income), highest level of education attained
(education), employment in a profession with high social
status (high status profession), assets (own), and financial
need (need), each of which might independently affect
access to welfare. Age, reported income, education and
high status profession are all categorical variables as
recorded in the survey. High status professions in this
study include the following occupational categories:
legislator, top manager, director, specialized professional
(e.g., law, medicine), technician or assistant in a specia-
lized profession, member of the armed forces, and mem-
ber of religious clergy. The own variable is an index
constructed from responses to a series of questions
asking whether the interviewee’s household owns a tele-
vision, satellite dish, telephone, cellphone, stereo,
refrigerator, car, or moped. The need variable is an index
constructed from responses to questions asking whether
the interviewee or his or her immediate family had pro-
blems paying rent or mortgage payments, lost a job,
postponed medical treatment for financial reasons, had
to borrow money, or sold personal items to raise money
in the past year.
Given the dichotomous construction of the dependent
variable, we employed logistic regression analysis. Stand-
ard errors are clustered at the neighborhood or village
level to take into account the possible correlation of
responses from households in the same geographic
areas.
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Table 2 presents the summary results of the logistic
regression. The unadjusted odds ratio (OR) of the im-
pact of political activism on the likelihood of receiv-
ing health aid is 1.41. Controlling for age, sex,
socioeconomic status, religious commitment, and
piety, political activism still (as measured by the PAI)
has a significantly positive association with the prob-
ability of receiving health aid (p<001), with an OR
of 144 with one unit increase in PAI. The magnitude
of the impact translates into an odds ratio of 40
when comparing individuals with the highest political
activity to those least active. On average, with all
other factors held at average levels, the most politic-
ally active individuals are over two times more likely
to receive financial assistance for health services than
t h el e a s ta c t i v eo n e s .F o re x a m p l e ,f o raw o m a ni n
her forties, an increase of political activity from a PAI level
of 0 to the maximum level in our sample would increase
the probability of receiving financial assistance for health
care from 31 percent to 58 percent. We also conducted a
series of analyses to examine whether there is any
Table 2 Logistic Regression of Political Activism and
Access to Financial Assistance for Health
Odds of receiving health aid
Unadjusted OR Adjusted OR
}
Overall political activism (PAI) 1.41** 1.44**
Individual components
of political activism
Volunteer for Party 2.62** 2.75**
Meeting freq. 1.03 1.01
Volunteer in 05’ election 1.94** 1.98**
Vote in 05’ election 1.10 1.20
Vote list 1.00 1.02
Party member 1.78** 1.91**
Party supporter 1.49** 1.44**
Poster display 1.94** 1.87**
Age 0.94
Sex (Female) 1.36*
Income 1.10
Education 0.93
High status profession 1.29
Own 0.70**
Need 1.18
Religious commitment 1.13
Piety 0.92
}Adjusted for age, sex, socioeconomic status (income, education, profession),
religious commitment and piety.
** p<0.01, * p<0.05.
Full results available at [AUTHOR WEBSITE].
Table 1 Descriptive Statistics (N=1789)
Frequency %
Sample
Receiving Health Aid
Frequency %
Age
<30 268 14.98% 106 39.55%
30-40 565 31.58% 182 32.21%
40-50 632 35.33% 226 35.76%
50-60 245 13.69% 82 33.47%
>60 79 4.42% 26 32.91%
Female 974 54.44% 360 36.96%
Reported household
monthly ncome
<=500 489 27.33% 192 39.26%
501-1000 863 48.24% 281 32.56%
1001-2000 346 19.34% 113 32.66%
2001-3000 63 3.52% 24 38.10%
>=3001 28 1.57% 12 42.86%
Education
Elementary 261 14.54% 119 45.59%
Intermediate 570 31.86% 196 33.86%
Secondary 427 23.87% 128 29.98%
Vocational 131 7.32% 53 40.46%
University 352 19.68% 113 32.10%
Higher degree 48 2.68 16 33.33%
High status profession* 210 11.74% 79 37.62%
Sectarian identity
Christian 782 43.71% 240 30.69%
Shia 414 23.14% 164 39.61%
Sunni 351 19.62% 137 39.03%
Druze 73 4.08% 26 35.62%
Orthodox 56 3.13% 23 41.07%
None 113 6.32% 32 28.32%
Reported political
party support
Free Patriotic Movement 162 9.06% 46 28.40%
Lebanese Forces 96 5.37% 34 35.42%
Kataeb 23 1.29% 3 13.04%
Future Movement 140 7.83% 74 52.86%
Hezbollah 121 6.76% 41 33.88%
Amal Movement 48 2.68% 36 75.00%
Progressive Socialist Party 44 2.46% 15 34.09%
Others 143 7.99% 61 42.66%
Do not support any party 1012 56.57% 312 30.83%
*High status professions include legislator, top manager, director, specialized
professional (i.e. law, medicine), technician or assistant in a specialized
profession, armed forces, and member of religious clergy.
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socioeconomic status, religious commitment, or piety, one
at a time. None of the interaction was statistically signifi-
cant at 95% confidence.
Figure 1 illustrates the linear relationship between
predicted financial access to health care and political
activity among the sample population. The vertical
axis of Figure 1 is the predicted probability of receiv-
ing health aid of individuals in our sample population
based on the logistic regression model, while the hori-
zontal axis depicts the value of the PAI of the same in-
dividual. The figure shows that even though there is
some variation in the probability of receiving health
aid for individuals of the same level of political activity,
as illustrated by the vertical spread of the observation
at any given PAI, on average, there is a clear positive
correlation between political activism and how likely
individuals could receive financial assistance to health
care.
We also examine the relationship between the likeli-
hood of receiving health aid with individual questions of
political activism in order to identify whether there are
specific components of political activism that have the
highest correlation with health care assistance. Un-
adjusted and adjusted odds ratios associated with the dis-
aggregate measures of political activism as derived from
the logistic regression analyses are also presented in
Table 2. The results show the relationship at the aggre-
gate level is driven by activities indicating a higher com-
mitment of the individuals to the parties, such as
volunteering or being a party member, rather than those
such as simply casting a ballot in an election or voting
for a full slate of party candidates. In other words, higher
investment activities have higher returns.
The empirical quantitative analyses indicate that
political activism is strongly associated with the receipt
of health services in Lebanon, even after controlling
for a range of demographic and other socially relevant
factors. Respondents in this nationally representative
survey were more likely to receive financial assistance
for health care if they engaged in various forms of
political participation such as declaring their support
for a political party, voting, shuttling others to the
polls on election days, volunteering for a party and
attending political meetings. As political activism
increases, access to assistance for health care rises.
The logistic regression results for the socioeconomic
indicators also exhibit some intriguing findings. The
probability of receiving financial aid for health is signifi-
cantly related to self-reported ownership of a range of
household items such as household appliances, cars and
mobile telephones (own), but not self-reported income.
This is most likely due to measurement error from
reporting household income and is consistent with
findings that assets rather than income offer a better in-
dication of economic status in developing countries [28]
The level of education attained and employment in a
high status profession also do not have a statistically
significant impact on the probability of receiving finan-
cial aid.
These findings are consistent with observations derived
from qualitative data, including in-depth interviews with
government officials, providers and ordinary citizens as
well as visits to health institutions. In Lebanon, the
Figure 1 Predicted Probability of Receiving Health Aid across Levels of Political Activism.
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part of a political strategy [29]. As the director of a major
Shi’i Muslim charity noted, “The provision of social
welfare services is both a tool and methodology that
political and religious forces use to enlarge their popularity.”
Similarly, in discussing the motivations for the establish-
ment of health clinics by local NGOs, a high-level official in
the Ministry of Public Health contended, “Low income
areas are more apt to get new centers . . . But [NGOs] don’t
do this for purely humanitarian reasons. It is either reli-
giously or politically motivated to boost their popularity
among the population.”
The qualitative interviews also revealed that the discre-
tionary allocation of assistance for health care occurs
through multiple channels. Some political organizations
and religious institutions operate their own health
centers, enabling them to offer subsidized or free
services to supporters. These organizations also have
connections to other private providers and to state offi-
cials who control access to public entitlements, allowing
them to serve as mediators to third-party services and to
act as gatekeepers to benefits that are supposed to be
social rights available to all citizens with demonstrated
need.
The discretionary allocation of health assistance
according to levels of political activism by definition con-
tributes to health inequities. Citizens with connections to
politicians and parties enjoy enhanced access to health
care. The director of a major hospital admitted that pol-
itical leaders sometimes call him to arrange hospital beds
or special treatment for their supporters: “Unfortunately,
people receive financial aid not according to need but
because of the requests of political leaders. The leaders
of different factions . . . say ‘he’s a poor man’ and there-
fore ask the hospital to help one of their supporters.”
Indeed, this discriminatory system may shape the chan-
nels people use to seek health assistance. Noting that
some citizens do not seek social assistance from political
organizations that they have not actively supported, a
resident of the predominantly Shi’i southern suburbs of
Beirut stated, “People do not ask for services from
Hezbollah if they are not supporters because they know
that they will not get much help.” Given that the largest
political parties are associated with particular religious
communities, partisan discrimination in the allocation of
health aid can take on sectarian overtones [24,30].
Discussions and conclusions
Our empirical quantitative and qualitative analyses have
consistently shown that individuals with higher political
activism have better access to health services than others
because of their likelihood of receiving financial assist-
ance. Questions may be raised that the direction of effect
could be the other way around; that is, political activism
is the result of receiving financial aid. Our findings about
the variable impact of the disaggregated measures of
political engagement provide support to our hypothesis
that political activism affects access to assistance for
health care, and not the reverse. For instance, our ana-
lysis suggested that having volunteered for a party in the
2005 national elections significantly increases the likeli-
hood of financial aid for health services, although it is
theoretically possible that individuals would work for a
party out of gratitude for prior financial assistance.
Nonetheless, because the survey was conducted in 2008,
it is less likely that one would volunteer in 2005 in the
expectation of the need for aid at a much later time.
The finding that higher political activism results in
better financial access to health services could be driven
by other factors correlated with political activism rather
than the level of political activism itself, especially when
individuals have higher social status whether due to in-
come, education or occupational category. In this study,
we address this potential confound by controlling for
several variables that capture social status, including
income, assets, education and high status profession. On
average, none of these variables except assets has a sta-
tistically significant effect on the likelihood of receiving
financial assistance in our results. Additionally, the find-
ings from qualitative interviews also give us confidence
that political activism itself is a significant and important
determinant of financial assistance for health care in
Lebanon. Future research could try to address this issue
by employing instrumental variables to isolate the causal
impact of political activism on health, if a viable instru-
ment is identifiable.
This paper contributes to the growing literature on the
political determinants of health and access to health care
by pointing to a micro-level mechanism that shapes
these outcomes, notably differential access to health
financing based on levels of political participation. While
most studies in this nascent literature point to formal,
macro-political institutions, our analyses highlight the
role of informal institutions and individual or household-
level exchanges in mediating access to health care and
point to a gap between de jure and de facto social rights:
Although needy citizens are eligible for public coverage
of treatment for certain diseases and for hospitalization,
in practice their access to these “entitlements” is
mediated at least in part by politicians and political orga-
nizations which exert influence over relevant agencies in
Lebanon. Given that access to health care can shape
health, these findings call for further research to explore
whether and in what ways informal politics affect health
outcomes.
Furthermore, this political dimension of health inequi-
ties exacerbates existing socioeconomic health inequalities
in developing countries like Lebanon [31]. Currently in
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some kind of health insurance, generally through formal
sector and government employment, although many are
underinsured and/or do not enjoy de facto access to public
entitlements [27]. The poor, who constitute the vast
majority of the uninsured, are the most likely to turn to
providers linked to political organizations for care,
because, as described earlier, NGO-run health clinics and
dispensaries, many run by political parties, are critical for
lower-income families in urban areas and may be the only
facilities available in rural areas. This makes them the most
susceptible to the discretionary allocation of services by
political intermediaries and they may not gain financial ac-
cess despite their need. Meanwhile, ironically, the higher-
income on the other hand may receive financial benefits
for health care through their political connections even
though they could actually afford the services by them-
selves.. Thus, political and socioeconomic factors may
interact to further intensify health inequities. The qualita-
tive and quantitative evidence for this phenomenon are
derived from field research in Lebanon, but there is reason
to believe that political behavior affects access to health
care elsewhere in the Middle East and in other countries
in the Global South with widely divergent levels of macro-
economic development. For example, the Sadrist Move-
ment in Iraq and Hamas in Palestine operate their own
welfare networks or mediate access to social services pro-
vided by public agencies or other non-state providers. Evi-
dence suggests that, at various historical moments, these
groups have funneled disproportionate benefits to their
supporters [32,33]. In India, the Hindu Nationalist
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has an affiliated social welfare
network that has disproportionately favored supporters, al-
though electoral considerations have compelled it to serve
beyond its base [34]. In Mexico, drug cartels run social
service networks in areas where the state does not provide,
funneling benefits to citizens in the areas they control [35].
Prior to the enactment of universal health coverage in
1995, supporters of the Kuomintang Party (KMT) in Tai-
wan received favorable access to health benefits, among
other advantages. These discriminatory practices even
took on quasi-ethnic dimensions as the main supporters
of the KMT were predominantly from Mainland China
rather than longstanding natives of the island [36].
Although each of these countries is characterized by
distinct social and political cleavages, the basic principle
of differential access to health care as a result of political
loyalties and behavior holds true. Discriminatory access
to medical care on the basis of political participation at
the individual and household levels can introduce new
health inequities, compounding existing imbalances
along socioeconomic lines. Political institutions – and,
particularly, informal institutions – are notoriously diffi-
cult to change, but enacting and enforcing policies to
provide more truly universal access to health benefits are
critical to ensure more equitable access to health in
contexts where politics constitute a source of health
disparities. Moreover, research should also carefully con-
sider micro-level political factors in assessing equity in
access to health care and health outcomes in order to
inform more effective policy-making.
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